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IN DEFENSE OF A MYSTICAL ONTOLOGY 
Philip Almond 
In a recent article1, Norman Melchert, while adopting a very sensitive and 
aware attitude towards mystical experience, nevertheless argues that 
ontological claims arising from unitive experience are unwarranted; and this 
for two reasons. Firstly, he maintains that to move from the fact that there is an 
experience of loss of the sense of the particularity of self to an ontological 
assertion of the nonindividuality of the experience is to make an invalid leap. 
And secondly, he argues that this mistaken leap into ontology arises from an 
error in epistemology, viz., that knowledge is characterisable as a state of the 
knower alone. 
In this note, I shall argue that (I) Melchert has not shown that an 
epistemological error has occurred, and that therefore (2) the assertion that 
ontological claims arising from unitive experience are unwarranted is an 
unjustified one. 
Melchert's demonstration of the epistemological error in mysticism may be 
summarised in the following series of propositions: 
(I) "knowing that p" entails that "p is true"; which means -
(I a) epistemic validity entails ontical status as determined by the criteria of 
onticity inherent in physical realism; 
(2) but for the mystic, the entailment relation is denied (or read incorrectly) 
and knowledge is viewed as solely characterisable as a state of the 
knower; 
(3) therefore, the mystical state is not an epistemic one. 
Melchert's argument as it stands is certainly valid. But, let us approach it 
from the perspective of a traveller on the mystic way (thereby allowing him 
also a measure of partisanship). With respect to proposition ( la), the traveller 
will certainly wish to deny that ontical determinations are dependent upon the 
criteria of physical realism, that is, sensuous and perceptual experience. If he 
does not wish to reject them altogether as illusory, he will at least only accord 
them a relative epistemological value, and not an absolute value. 
This rejection of the ultimacy of the criteria of physical realism will entail 
the rejection of proposition ( 1 ), or if not its rejection then its reformulation. 
For, proposition ( 1) is merely a disguised version of proposition ( 1 a), the latter 
revealing the assumption of physical realism inherent in the former. This is not 
to assert that the traveller denies the necessity of a relationship between 
epistemology and ontology, but rather it is to maintain that the traveller denies 
any relation of entailment between the two. But, this does not imply, as is 
implied by proposition (3), that therefore knowledge is viewed as solely 
characterisable by the state of the knower. Rather, since there is in the unitive 
experience no longer any distinction between knower, known, and state of 
knowing, the distinction between epistemology and ontology is dissolved, 
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knowing and being are one. 
This closing of the gap between epistemology and ontology during the 
unitive experience also closes the gap between e.g. the loss of the sense of the 
particularity of the self and the post-experiential ontological assertion of the 
nonindividuality of the experiencer. For, in the state of normal consciousness 
subsequent to the unitive experience proposition ( 1) is perfectly acceptable. If 
pis the statement "Ultimately I am one with the Absolute", then knowing that 
p does entail the truth of p, for the truth of the latter is verified by the prior 
experience. 
Therefore by the closing of the gap between epistemology and ontology in 
the unitive experience, the gap between such experience and ontological claims 
made on the basis of it is also thus closed. 
In conclusion, my aim has not been to argue that all ought to be travellers on 
this particular way, but only to show why those who have set out ought not to 
return for the reasons offered by Melchert. 
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